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Aspiring Consensus in Scientific Practice: grasping consensus driven motivations by 
introducing a continuum ranging from consensus conferences to meta-analysis 
 
In this paper, I propose a way to grapple consensus driven motivations that are apparent in many 
sciences - i.e. climate science, medical science and psychology - resulting in either consensus 
conferences,  meta-analysis or something in between. My research will focus on the way in which 
assessment reports are produced by the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), the 
CAG (Canadian Association of Gastroenterology) and the Psychological Bulletin. What I 
propose is that their different ways of handling research results - and moreover aspiring 
consensus - have to be seen as part of a continuum. 
 
In the first part, I present an account of scientific consensus, which will help us to get a 
satisfactory grasp of what ‘consensus’ entails in these diverse organisations. This notion is based 
on Habermas’ consensustheory (1971), Fuller’s essential consensus (1986) and Beatty’s 
deliberative acceptance (2011); wary of negative influences associated with accidental consensus 
(Fuller, 1986), joint acceptance (Gilbert, 1987) and the unanimity requirement (Solomon, 2006). 
 
In the second part, an analysis of the review process behind the organisations’ different 
assessment reports will be put forward. On the one hand, my notion of continuum is grounded by 
the fact that these organisations all share the same benefits. This is done by referring to the 
notions of reliability, fecundity and practical benefit as proposed by Thagard (1999). On the other 
hand, the extent to which the organisations appeal to deliberative interaction between actors 
serves as the criterion for ascribing them a place on my continuum.  
 
This descriptive analysis allows me - in the final part of the paper - to propose some normative 
suggestions on how the review-processes of (1) consensus conferences and (2) meta-analyses 
should be structured to increase their efficiency. 
First, I propose that there are differences in the ways researchers interact with each other, 
differences that turn out to have an effect on the efficiency of the corresponding conferences. For 
example, when accounting for dissenting opinions, implementing means to allow for 
‘deliberation’ between actors has a more promising turnout than stressing the mere need for 
‘aggregation’ of opinions. Secondly, I propose that extending the group of consensus participants 
with stakeholders enhances the reliability of consensus conferences, whereas this will not be of 
great use to meta-analysis.  
Implementing these normative suggestions in scientific practice will have a positive effect on the 
relation between scientists and the general public, augmenting democratic accountability of 
science without weakening its scientific legitimacy.  
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